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Constitutional issues could be more satisfactorily handled
outside of the Parliamentary framework
blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/constitutional-issues-parliament-blick/
Andrew Blick argues for removing decisions about constitutional change from the immediate
sphere of party politics. This may allow for House of Lords reform and other issues that have
been difficult to resolve in the traditional manner.
The collapse of House of Lords reform leaves issues involving the second chamber, principally
its composition, unresolved. Abandonment of coalition policy in this area also draws attention to
the way in which constitutional change is brought about in the UK.
The full assessment of UK democracy recently produced by Democratic Audit  raised concerns that constitutional
alteration in the UK is not brought about in a sufficiently impartial or inclusive fashion. The Audit noted a key
feature of the ‘unwritten’ UK constitution. Strictly speaking, all that is required for the constitution to be modified is
for the UK Parliament – which is often described as ‘sovereign’ – to act alone using its regular legislative
procedures. In fact, simple majorities in only one House of Parliament, the Commons, are sufficient to secure
nearly all kinds of change, since the veto powers of the House of Lords are significantly limited by the Parliament
Acts 1911/1949. And just as Parliament can bring about change in this straightforward way, it can block it simply
by not acting. In other words, constitutional change can be very easy for the group controlling the Commons, and
very difficult for everyone else if that group does not agree.
This arrangement gives rise to two questions: the first which asks if it is satisfactory and the second, if there is a
better approach available.
The supreme legal position of Parliament means that as well as being one player amongst many within the
constitutional framework, it is also able unilaterally to alter that framework. A conflict of interest arises. Parliament
can even change rules applying to its own operation, as it did recently with the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011,
which created a standard parliamentary term (of a controversially-long five years) and placed the triggering of
dissolutions on a statutory basis. Equally, opposition from within Parliament to a possible change to its
composition, as with Lords reform, can prevent it from taking place.
Moreover, since the dominant group in the Commons, the preeminent House of Parliament, also forms the
government, there is a danger of constitutional changes being brought about which are inappropriately biased in
favour of the UK-level executive. For instance, legislation is frequently passed by Parliament which transfers
powers from local government to Whitehall.
In addition to that of conflict of interest, the second problem is that Parliament is able to act unilaterally,
minimising outside involvement. The principle that a constitution should be subject to broad social ownership
and should not be the property of any one institution or group is thereby challenged. It should be noted that
Parliament can if it chooses provide for referendums on issues (it has done so increasingly, for instance, over
devolution); and it can legislate to make the outcomes of those referendums binding (as are referendums under
the European Union Act 2011). However, many recent substantial changes – such as the Human Rights Act
1998; the Freedom of Information Act 2000; the Constitutional Reform Act 2005; the Constitutional Reform and
Governance Act 2010; the European Union Act 2011; the Localism Act 2011 and the Fixed-term Parliaments Act
2011 – did not involve referendums; and in some cases even basic standards of consultation were not adhered
to.
Nonetheless the use of referendums demonstrates that, regardless of the strict legal position, Parliament
operates subject to practical constraints when it seeks to alter the constitution. In some circumstances additional
processes will be judged necessary to legitimise an alteration, and the outcome may be that a proposal is
rejected, as with the referendum on a directly elected assembly for the North East region of England in 2004.
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Conventions have developed to the effect that Parliament cannot legislate for devolved matters without
agreement at devolved level. It also seems that there is emerging a principle that nations or areas can secede
from the UK, subject to the approval of their populations in referendums, with the UK Parliament, legal niceties
notwithstanding, unable to prevent them.
However, decisions by Parliament about whether to permit wider involvement in constitutional change involve
political calculations rather than clearly defined rules.
How might constitutional modification be handled differently? First, most other democracies have ‘written’
constitutions which define what the consitution is and how it can be amended. Consequently, it is not for a
government or national legislature to decide what procedures need to be applied to any given change, rather
there are fixed regulations to be followed. Second, the basic legal requirements to be fulfilled if a constitution is to
be altered are likely to be more demanding than those of the standard procedures of the legislature. For
instance, some kind of legislative supermajority threshold might be involved, or obligatory referendums. By these
means constitutional change is made dependent upon a higher degree of consensus than is often the case in
the UK.
But such stipulations would not deal with the particular issue presented by the dropping of House of Lords
reform. While they might become more dependent upon others for bringing about changes, Parliament or the
dominant group within the Commons would still often possess a veto. If they did not want to pursue a particular
proposal, it would probably not proceed, regardless of the views of others.
Bypassing this problem might involve finding ways to remove decisions about constitutional change from the
immediate sphere of party politics. The Scottish constitutional convention which sat from the late 1980s,
including members of different parties and various civil society groups, was able to create substantial momentum
around the proposals it developed for devolution. Over the last decade there have been experiments with
citizens’ assemblies in Canada and elsewhere, selected from the general public by lot (sortition), as a means of
considering possible electoral systems, away from the usual policy-making environment.
Perhaps such a body could be deployed effectively in the UK to consider House of Lords reform and other
constitutional issues which have proved difficult to resolve. Through such methods the ends of impartiality and
inclusiveness in constitutional change might be well served.
Note:  This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of
the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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